2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

631 The relations between such independent local groups[1] were not markedly affected either
642 by genealogical groupings or by political affiliations. Thus war might be carried on between
721 two uru closely connected by descent from a common parent group, or between parent group and offshoot, or between two unrelated groups both owing allegiance to the same khan.

721 Such local wars, "barantas" (barɓmta), were usually considered as reprisals for damage
628 done by one group to another. They might continue for generations and take on the nature of hereditary feuds.[28] It is difficult at this time to obtain precise data on their cause and origin. According to my informants they usually resulted from thefts of cattle, raids on hay fields, and personal injury or murder committed by members of one group against those
[627] of another. Such episodes in inter-group relations would normally first be referred to a meeting of the bij and aqsaqal of both groups. The meeting was called bitim, literally "peace" or "truce." Here an effort was made to fix responsibility and the amount of damages to be paid in compensation for the injury done. If the immediate parties concerned were not particularly important individuals a decision agreeable to the leaders of both groups would probably be reached amicably and the offending party ordered to pay the proper fine. If, however, the principals to the dispute were both influential men in their respective groups the meeting would probably end in a disagreement because a judge would rarely agree to a decision counter to the interests of a powerful member of his own group, who would probably be his close relative. In case of such a deadlock the man who considered himself the injured party might gather his own followers, and if sufficiently influential his whole uru, and proceed to make a small scale war upon his adversary. Such wars might indeed be major military operations if the importance of the individuals concerned were sufficiently great.

It therefore becomes difficult to distinguish between barantas as cases of personal revenge and as wars involving whole uru which were obliged to support the interests of their leaders. Levshin, however,[29] describes an instance of a baranta of a private nature entered upon by an individual to collect damages to which he was entitled by judgment of the court but which had not been paid. In this case, according to Levshin, the injured party was authorized by the chief of his aul to exercise reprisals, but on his return was obliged to swear that the amount of damage which he had done or booty which he had collected did not exceed the amount of the original claim. Levshin[30] states elsewhere that whereas formerly a baranta was only entered upon after deliberation by the chiefs in cases of culpable refusal to pay judgments, in his time any malcontent who could gather around him a band of followers might attack the herds and dwellings of his enemy.

628 The essential problem connected with the subject of baranta is the extent of solidarity
565 of the uru and its collective responsibility for injuries done to its blood members. Here it is

[28] See Levshin, *Déscription des hordes*, 302, 349–51, 400, note 1; Dingelstedt, *Le Droit coutumier*, 434.
[29] *Déscription des hordes*, 400.
[30] *Idem*, 349.

1 [See cat. 116, p65 -- Analyst]

[135]

Part II. Ideas on the History of the Present-day Kirghiz-Kazaks.

Chapter 3. On the Origin of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and their Condition until their Submission to Russia in 1730.

121 The lack of authentic documents on the basis of which to write a history of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, the impossibility of taking advantage of their traditions, and our determination not to make suppositions which are pure guesses would leave us with nothing positive to say to our readers on the origin of this people if our honored orientalist, Mr. Senkovsky, had not been kind enough to give us help. Having profited from his works and his knowledge of the history of the Orient, we will complete here the account of what we know about the Kirghiz-Kazaks by glancing at their history, from their origin to the time when they began to appear in Russian chronicles, that is, until the middle of the 16th century.

173 175 For the last hundred years most Russians have believed and written that the first Kazaks sprang from the Tatars, or took form among them, and that the name Kazak arose among them, whence it was extended to all the Kazaks [136] of former times and to those who exist today. However, specialists in Oriental history are firmly refuting this opinion to which one is so accustomed in Russia and which has given rise to so many debates among the scholars there. These specialists affirm that the Kazaks formed an independent and compact nation in the earliest centuries of our era, and some even trace their existence back to a period well before the birth of Christ. It is certain that Firdevsi (or [114] Ferdussi), who lived in 1020, that is, two centuries before the Mongols appeared in the west, spoke in his history of Rurtam of a Kazak people and Kazak khans. His work and the most ancient [101 Persian chronicles upon which he has drawn inform us that the 721] ancient Kazaks, like those of today, made themselves famous by plundering and raiding and that their principal weapon was the

[136 cont.]

173 175 721 101 spear. For this reason in Asia the name Kazak began to be applied to all mounted bands armed with spears who practiced the calling of the true Kazaks, that is, who engaged in brigandage and raids upon neighboring lands. Thus the Tatar Kazaks, whom the Russians believed to be the first Kazaks, were only imitators, and their name was not Tatar but borrowed from another people. If this idea is established and irrefutable it destroys all the explanations and interpretations which have been made for the word "Kazak."

101 175 The meanings which have been given it since are based only on the conformity of certain peoples with the true and primitive Kazaks in way of life and type of arms. But the name, itself, as a proper name, does not lend itself to any translation or etymological argument. For this reason, those who have derived this word from koziavka; from koza, "goat" or "goatskin" (1);

114

1. Unpublished work on the Kazaks, mentioned in Karamzin's history of Russia, Vol. V.

from Kipchak (2); or from a tongue [137] of land on the Dnieper

2. Remarques sur l'histoire d'Aboulghazi [Observations on the History of Abulgazi], Part II, Chapter V.

called Kossa in Russian (1), or from Kazak, meaning Slavic gen-

1. Scherer, Annales de la petite Russie [Annals of Little Russia, Strasbourg, 1788]; and Gartknokh [Hartknoch, C.J.], Histoire de la république de Pologne [De republica Polonica..., 1687].

eral (2), or from Khozare (3); etc., have gone to useless trouble.

2. Synopsis.

3. Sestrenzcevitch /Siestrzeńcewicz/, Histoire de la Tauride /Brunswick, 1780/.

[139 cont.]
175 collected many geographical notes on Russia as well as on the neighboring countries, he wrote the following in his memoirs (2):

2. See his Rerum Moscoviti/c/arum Commentarii, Basle, 1571, p. 91.

[101] Ad Orientem (from the lands of the realm of Kazad /Kazan/) autem aestivalem Tartaros quos Schibauski et Kozatski vocant, conterminos habent /to the desert East, however, they have neighbors whom the Shibautski and Kozatski call Tartars/. He repeats (3)

3. Ibidem.

almost the same thing in another place. Jenkinson, who was in Bukhara in 1558 and 1559, says that the ruler of Tashkent was [721 181 771] then at war with the Kazaks, a numerous and cruel people, who had no cities and were Moslems (4). It was no doubt on the basis

4. See Collection of Travels to the North, Vol. IV.

of this remark that the lands of the Kirghiz-Kazaks were previously 175 known on our maps in Europe under the name of the lands of the 101 Tatar Kazaks (5). The Russians had known them at least a century

5. Vitzen /Witsen, Nicolaas/, in his Noord and /en/ Oost Tartary, included a map entitled "Asia ex magna orbis terrae descriptione Gerardi mercatoris disumpta, studio et industriâ G.M. junioris; edita anno M.D.LXXXVII." On this map he wrote "Kazaki Tartari" south of the Margus River toward the Caspian Sea.

earlier because of their frequent relations with the Nogais. We find the evidences of this first of all in Herberstein's notes on the Kirghiz-Kazaks, cited above, which he collected in Moscow in

[139 cont.]
175 101 the beginning of the 16th century, and in the second place in the documents of the relations with the [140] Nogais preserved in Moscow in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We find in the latter, under the year 1534, that an envoy of Tsar Ivan Groznoi (the Terrible) named Danila Gubin, then among the Nogais, reported the following: "And the Kazaks, sire, are [721] said to be very strong; and it is said, sire, that they waged war against Teshken (Tashkent); and the son of the king of Teshken is said to have fought against them twice, and the Kazaks defeated them." Likewise Semen Maltsov, sent in 1569 by Tsar Ivan Groznoi among the Nogais, who lived between the Volga and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers, spoke of the attack which "the Kazak hordes of Tsar Aknazar, Tsarevitch Shigai, and Tsarevitch Chelim" (1) made upon their ulus. These accounts, which we

1. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, note 245.

include here only because of their antiquity, tell us nothing about the name of the Kirghiz-Kazaks.

175 648 439 Four years later, however, Ivan resolved to establish political relations with them, persuaded no doubt by the demand of the Stroganovs who had established commercial relations with the Kazak horde. This circumstance obliged the Tsar to protect them and reach out to them by sending a deputy to the chief of the horde. This mission was entrusted to /the Muscovite/ Tretiak /deputy?/ Chebukov (2). But he was taken prisoner near the Kama

2. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 378.

River in 1573 by the famous Mametkul, nephew of Kuchum, the khan of Siberia, before he arrived at his destination. With the failure of this first attempt to open relations with the Kirghiz-Kazaks, Ivan put off a second attempt till a more favorable time. On May 30, 1774 /1574/, however, he gave the Stroganovs a letter patent, granting them permission to trade with the

[140 cont.]
175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).
[648
439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia /Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../, p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[643] [141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and [662] Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia; Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaia Istoriia..., 1774/, introduction, article 84; Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

● [721 797] Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86 and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[142 cont.]
175 his sons, the Tsarevitch or Sultan Hussein, as hostage in his
648 place (2).
63

2. For this letter, see the packet [envoi] preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This letter was conveyed by Tevkel's ambassador, who was accompanied by Veliamin-Stepanov, interpreter for the Tatar language.

What sort of news Stepanov may have brought to the Tsar upon his return from the horde is unknown. It is only known that his journey produced no political advantage for Russia, that neither Tevkel nor his successors were Russian subjects until the 18th century, and that they neither served Russia nor rendered her
● [121] any kind of help. On the contrary, they attacked her new colonies in Siberia.

175 One must believe, however, that those who lived on the
648 frontiers of the new Russian territorial possessions must have had
439 frequent relations with them, as did our merchants, at that time, and that they acquired accurate knowledge about their country. For in the book Bolshoi Chertezh /The Great Description, which according to the well-founded evidence of Karamzin must have been written during the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich (3) /1584-

3. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 259.

1598/, many dwelling places which existed on the lands of the Kazak horde are spoken of in great detail.

131 [143] As this book is rare, we believe it is not irrelevant to quote that which concerns the steppes of the Kirghiz-Kazaks:

"And from the Sea of Khvalymsk (Caspian) to the Blue Sea (Aral), toward the east of summer, it is 250 versts /266 km./.

"And along the Blue Sea to the mouth of the Syr /Darya River/ it is 280 versts /299 km./, and across, by the Blue Sea,

[144 cont.]

175 At first the Kirghiz-Kazaks advanced northward. Fisher, in his history of Siberia (3), says that after the town of Tary was

3. I. E. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia s Samogo Otkrytiia Sibiri do Zavoevyvaniia sei Zemli Rossiiskim Oruzhiem (The History of Siberia from the very Discovery of Siberia to its Conquest by Russian Arms), 1774], Russian translation, p. 180.

completed in 1594, the district of Kurdak was added to it, where the foundation of a fortress was laid to stop the raids of the Kalmuks and Kirghiz-Kazaks. Thus the latter were no longer far from the Russian borders.

They did not expand eastward until after the extermination of the [145] Dzungartan peoples by the Chinese, in other words, about the middle of the last [18th] century.

[233] They expanded westward at the beginning of the 18th century, but at the end of the 17th century and even in the first years of the 18th, the Bashkirs were nomadizing between the raised regions of the Ural and the Emba rivers, while the Kalmuks had established themselves at the mouths of these rivers (1).

1. Kirilov, original founder of the Orenburg confederacy and author of the reconciliation between the Russians and the Kirghiz [i.e. Kazaks], wrote in one of his plans, in 1734: "Dorzhi-Nazarov, khan of the nomadic Kalmuks near the Emba and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers." See Kirilov's plans in the archives of the districts of Asia, 1734.

175 In the south, the Kirghiz [i.e. the Kazaks] were not satisfied
●721 with making raids over the borders of the neighboring peoples. According to our chronicles, they were already the masters of

[145 cont.]

175 721 Turkestan at the beginning of the 17th century, and this city was always the residence of their khans. The year in which this conquest took place and the leader of the campaign are unknown. We could not even discover where Khan Murtaza, Kuchum's father, lived, nor whether his descendants reigned over the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] for a long period. Nor did we have any more success in our research concerning Khan Ak-Nazar, who attacked the uluses of the Nogais in 1569, when Semen Maltsov, the envoy of Tsar Ivan the Terrible was there (2). We have gathered

2. See above, p. 140.

some definite evidence, however, that Ishim khan of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, held Turkestan around 1630.

175 [114] Abulgazi Baiadur is the first to speak of it, and it is referred to for the second time in the Annals of Siberia. We have found still more information about it in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg, in the file for 1748.

Abulgazi Baiadur made the acquaintance of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and Khan Ishim about the year 1630 (3), because at this

3. Histoire Généalogique des Tatars, /Leiden, 1726/, Pt. IX, Chapter XI.

time he was forced by his brother Isfandiar, khan of Urgendzhi, to flee his homeland, and he withdrew to Turkestan, where Khan Ishim [146] received him and protected him for three months. After that he escorted him to Tashkent and placed him under the protection of Tursun, khan of that country. Two years later these two princes fell into disagreement. Ishim killed Tursun and seized Tashkent, and Abulgazi withdrew into the realm of Bukhara.

[162 578]

175 721 Ishim Khan is known in the Siberian chronicles for his disagreements and his wars, and particularly for the wars of his son Djangir, or Iangir, with the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, Batur, or Bagatyr (1). Fisher says that Bagatyr opened war on

1. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia..., Bk. IV, Pt. 3, paragraph 13.

[146 cont.]

175 721 Ishim in 1635, and that Djangir, then the commander of the Kirghiz-Kazak army, was taken prisoner. When he had regained his liberty by chance, he wished to avenge himself against the Dzungars, and tormented them constantly by his raids. In order to force peace over a long period, or if possible to completely exterminate such dangerous neighbors, Bagatyr assembled an army of 50,000 men, made up of an equal number of his own men and those of his allies.

175 721 At the head of his forces he easily subdued two descent lines of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, 10,000 persons altogether. He would have continued to destroy all those whom Djangir set in opposition to him if this Kirghiz [-Kazak] sultan, a gifted warrior as one can see, had not used the most salutary measures in defending himself. He had only 600 armed men, and not daring 175 to attack the enemy openly with this handful of men, he placed 723 half of his group in a gorge between two mountains, causing them to be surrounded by a deep ditch and with a raised entrenchment. Then he himself lay in wait with the other half on the other side of the mountain. The Dzungars arrived in front of the entrenchment and attacked it. While they were losing many men in this struggle, in which they were at a disadvantage because of the narrow expanse of the terrain, Djangir fell upon them from the rear. This unexpected attack, the daring of the men he had chosen for this purpose, and the excellence of the guns with which they were all [147] armed, inflicted great losses upon Bagatyr. At this moment Alantush, the Tatar prince, arrived to support the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] at the head of 20,000 fresh troops and completed Bagatyr's ruin. The Dzungars were forced to withdraw and to limit their vengeance to taking away the prisoners they had taken during the battle. The Kazaks continued to harass them with frequent raids, not only during Bagatyr's time, but also under his successors.

175 648 We found the third reference to Ishim in the papers of Tevkelev, former interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later major general. He spent two years among the

[147 cont.]

175 Kirghiz [-Kazak] hordes by order of Empress Anna, and induced
648 them to submit themselves to Russia. Later, as we shall see below, he was for a long time a member of the Orenburg Commission. In following government orders, he was in constant contact with the Kirghiz [-Kazak] khans and sultans. He knew their language thoroughly and kept a journal of the oral conferences he
[115] had with them. He says, in one of these journals, written in 1748, that Abulkhair, khan of the Little Horde, and Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, and the most distinguished sultans had informed him of their genealogies.

We will place the three charts which we have composed at the end of this work.

175 The first chart shows us that Djadek, one of the two
643 founders of a line, was the father of Shigai Khan, whose son was Ishim, the same one whom, as we mentioned earlier, was khan
● [121] of Turkestan when he waged war against the kungtaidji of the Dzungar and to whom Abulgazi Bahadur went to seek refuge.

It is easy to prove that this Ishim is not some other unknown Kazak khan, for Abul Mahmet, who gave Tevkelev this genealogy (1) and called himself the [148] great-grandson of

1. Abul Mahmet wrote the same thing about his origin to Prince Urusov, on July 19, 1740. See the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission. With two accounts as certain as this, we can assure our readers [148] that the Siberian Herald /Sibirskii Vestnik/ of 1820, on page 114 of the article on the Kazaks, is wrong in calling Abul Mahmet the son of Kuchiuk.

Ishim, was born at the end of the 17th century, as can be seen from many writings and other papers of this time. If we go back from this prince to his father, his grandfather, and so forth, we will find that Ishim in his youth and Djangir at a mature age

175 [150 cont.]
631 We could not find any information on Pulat, son of Khan
173 Tiavka and father of Abul Mahmet, who is found in the table.

175 The traditions say only that the calm re-established by
721 Tiavka did not last long among the Kazaks. Dissensions and troubles began again, and the neighboring peoples were quick to profit from them. On the west they were attacked by the Volga Kalmuks [Kalmyk], and on the north by the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of Siberia. But the most terrible of all were the Dzungars to the east. At this time their chief was the powerful Kungtaidji Galdan Tsyren, who not only made all the nomadic peoples tremble but also spread terror in Russia and China. In this unfortunate situation, the Kazaks could not expect help except from the power of Peter the Great, whose vast genius, concerned with the glory and welfare of his people, watched over the Asian border while he had the most important dealings in Europe.

176 Prince Gagarin was governor of Siberia at that time. The
648 Tsar commanded him not only to open relations with the Kazaks,
662 but to help them, if possible, against Galdan Tsyren, in order to put some check on the continual increase of power of the Dzungarian leader. Gagarin carried out the Tsar's commands in 1717, and the Kazak khans, Tiavka, Kaip, and Abulkhair (2)

2. We have drawn this information from works and translations /Sochineniia i Perevody, k Polze i Uveseleniiu Sluzhashchiia/ of January, 1760. See the article on the "golden saber" /Izvestie o pesotnom zolote v Bukharii... (On the Gold [A3] Dust in Bukharo)/. The Khan Tiavka in question must be the famous legislator of the Kazaks of whom we have spoken. But at this time he was already very old. His weakness and the loss of power which ensued, were no doubt the cause of the election, while he still lived, of the khans Abulkhair and Kaip, whose names we see here for the first time (the year 1717).

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175
721 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
726 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant

[151 cont.]
175 raids of the Kazaks. The Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and
●721 the Siberian Cossacks began to attack again with more strength
726 than ever. Galdan Tsyren could not watch the ruin of the old enemies of his people with composure, nor leave unavenged the aggressions and wrongs which his ancestors had been obliged to endure for more than a century. After having delivered several terrible blows against them, he [152] seized Turkestan, the capital of their khans, in 1723 (1), in addition to Tashkent and Sairam,

1. Nepluev and Rychkov, in their reports written from Orenburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often say that Abulkhair lived in Turkestan until 1723, at which time he was driven out by the Dzungars.

and finally he brought several branches of the Great Horde and the Middle Horde completely under his rule.

[722] A similar fate awaited all the other Kirghiz-Kaisaks [Kazaks], who were pressed and pursued from all sides, and they might have been completely exterminated if they had not retreated to the south. The remnants of the Great Horde and a small part of the Middle Horde fell back toward Khodzhent /Leninabad/, most
175 of the Middle Horde retreated to Samarkand, and the Little Horde
167 moved to Khiva and the realm of Bukhara (2). These migrations
731

2. This is what the famous elder of the Middle Horde, Bukenbai, said to Tevkelev when they met in Orsk in 1748, and he added: "At that time we fled before the Kalmuks, the Siberian and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks, and the Bashkirs like hares before the hounds."

brought inevitable ruin and disaster in their wake. The herds and the studs dwindled from one day to the next, and misfortune and misery befell everyone, some died of hunger, and others abandoned

[153 cont.]
175
[166
726] latter, like that of the Volga Kalmuks, did not compare with the power of the Dzungars, nevertheless the lands which the Kazaks had seized belonged to them, and consequently they wished to [721] give no peace to the people who had taken the lands from them. Expeditions for revenge and constant raids were planned for the future and began from this moment. The Cossacks of the Ural, [648] new neighbors of the Kazaks, promised to do the same. It was necessary to seek a defender against so many enemies; it was necessary to ask help from Russia. Perhaps this thought had often come to the minds of the sultans and the wisest elders, but it was difficult not only to put it into execution, but also to propose it to the people. Although we find in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed account of the articles proposed orally in 1726 by Kaibakar, deputy of the Kazaks, who [154] came to ask the protection of Russia for the Little Horde, in the name of the elders Sugur, Iedikbai, Khadjibai, Tiak-Kulybai, and others, nevertheless this communication had no decisive sequel. Judging by the names of the elders who sent Kaibakar, one is forced to think that they were too weak and inconspicuous to win the people over to them, and their mission remained unsuccessful. It is not known what suddenly led them to take this step, but one can be sure that most of the Kazaks were displeased by it. They preferred their barbarous freedom to any kind of order [636 and to dependence upon laws, nor had they forgotten that the 181] tenets of their religion commanded them to regard the Russians as infidels.

[648 These two obstacles seemed to make the free union of the
636] Kazak hordes with a Christian empire impossible. But unfortunate circumstances, endless dissensions, bloodshed, and the clever mind of Khan Abulkhair changed the inclinations of the people to the point where, after a feeble resistance, he decided to carry out a measure, based on the individual views of a single man, to which he could not have been moved by love of the public weal. I speak here of the voluntary submission of the Kazaks to Empress Anna, an event which took place in 1730, as we shall see below.

[128] Before coming to the description of this revolution, which is so important, we should note here that it forms the line of

[157 cont.]
desired to protect and facilitate their trade at Orenburg. The conditions suggested by Djulbars show that he was thinking less about submission than of profiting from the advantages of trade relations, and experience justified this assumption. Djulbars did not swear his loyalty and never even came to the border. The letter patent prepared in Petersburg on July 17, 1739 as a result of his promises still rests today in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

Later the Russian government received several more proposals related to the submission of the Great Horde, but these were made by sultans or individual tribal chiefs whose authority did not extend over the entire horde and who desired the gifts which the Russian sovereigns made to their new subjects more than the protection of the empire.

Besides, if the Great Horde had decided to submit with the Little Horde in 1730, or with its Khan Djulbars in 1738, it would have found great obstacles to the fulfillment of its desire. The contiguity of the Dzungars and the distance of the Great Horde from the Russian frontier would have stopped it. Galdan Tsyren or Cheren, Kungtaidji of the Dzungars, would never have allowed his Kazak neighbors to take such a step, for he sustained a hereditary hatred against them and never allowed an opportunity to escape for oppressing them or avenging the wrongs done to his forefathers. [721] The union of the Middle and the Little Hordes with Russia persuaded him to reduce the Great Horde to a position where it could not follow the example of the others; he attacked it, defeated it, and subjugated it.

This conquest, however, like all victories won over nomadic peoples, could not be a permanent one. Even though the Russian employees who were then (1) in the [158] Kazak steppes said

1. See Lt. Gladyshev's journal preserved in Orenburg at the Border Commission.

that Galdan's new subjects gave him a korsak /steppe fox/ pelt apiece as a sign of their submission, nevertheless misfortune could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

[158 cont.]
could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

When they realized that it was impossible for them to keep their old regions on Lake Balkash, they drew back to the Tsuya and Sara-Su [Sary-Su?] rivers. Later when they united their forces, they attacked Tashkent and Turkestan and laid them waste, as well as many other cities and villages belonging to those two states, and they acquired so much power over the residents of Tashkent that they forced them to choose their khans from the horde.

Shubai, Arslanov, and Mansur, residents of the former province of Vyatka, came from Tashkent to Orenburg in 1742 (1)

1. See the file for 1742 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and told how the khan named above ruled in Tashkent until 1739, and that a powerful old Kazak named Tiul Biu shared his authority, and every year they levied a tribute on the city. Later Djulbars was killed, but Tiul Biu continued to rule after him for a time and to levy tribute. A certain Kussiak Bek, a tributary subject of Galdan Tsyren, and perhaps his lieutenant, put an end to the power of Tiul Biu.

He was the ruler of Tashkent while Shubai and Mansur were there, but the Dzungarian sovereign received the tribute he took from the people. According to our travelers, under Kussiak Bek the Kazaks had no more influence over Tashkent, but they restrained the environs of this city to such a degree that it was as though under a state of permanent siege. They cultivated land under its walls, seized the neighboring forests, and at the slightest dissatisfaction they seized the residents of the city and the merchants who came to trade with them.

Turkestan too was for a certain time in a [159] similar position, although the Kazaks did not hinder the Dzungars from trading there. As for the small towns between Tashkent and Turkestan, the Kazaks who conquered them during this period kept them until the beginning of the present [19th] century.

[159 cont.]

×648 ●721 We are obliged to note with surprise, however, that in spite of these conquests and hostilities of a people subject to Galdan Tsyren, the Great Horde never dared to go and attack the Dzungars, nor even to call themselves independent of them.

×648 662 Some years later, in 1749, Tiul Biu, who had been driven out of Tashkent by Kusiak [sic] Bek and was dissatisfied by his insignificance, wished to elevate himself through the protection of Russia, and he sent deputies to Orenburg to propose that he become a Russian subject (1). His weakness was no doubt known

1. Tevkelev mentions this in one of his journals.

to the Russian government, and his proposal also had no effect.

[152] The terror with which the Dzungars filled the Kazaks and *the apparent submission of the latter lasted until internal dissensions* began to weaken the Dzungars and until these dissensions finally led to the complete dispersal of this people, as is known. The disagreement had scarcely begun to be noticeable when the Kazaks took the most active part in it. They offered asylum to all the exiled Dzungarian princes and zaisangs, and joined with [726] them to avenge their wrongs. They attacked their enemies, and on the pretext of helping the unfortunate, they never let the opportunity pass of weakening their old enemies by raids. Finally, when the Chinese wished to interfere in the dissensions of the Dzungars, and the success of their arms had reduced Galdan Tsyren's successors to a state of utter weakness, then the Kazaks of the Great Horde took Amursan's (2) side and formed a part of

2. This prince was the last Dzungarian sovereign. At first he was a subject of China, then her enemy, and he died in Russia.

the army which opposed the invaders [160] until 1756, the time when the Dzungarian empire, which had been so powerful ten years earlier, fell under the blows of the Chinese. The people who had

[160 cont.]

comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending their pasture lands over excellent places.

The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts, and having often had to fight against them, have become more warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

[160 cont.]
approach of the [161] Torguts to his lands and of the misfortunes they had had to endure in the Middle Horde, he prepared at once to fight them once more and with the utmost severity. He called upon Sultan Ablai to attack them from the rear and his weaker allies to make a flank assault, while he himself marched to meet the enemy at the head of his elite troops, taking the precaution of sending his family, as well as the women, children, and old people, and their most precious possessions, to places sheltered from danger. These first plans were very well conceived but were not as fully successful as was expected, for Ablai refused to participate in carrying them out. Erali (1) remained alone, and

1. Prince Tsichi calls this sultan Erelinasali. This name is not Kazak and was no doubt erroneously composed from two names or was distorted by the Chinese.

since he was much weaker than the Torguts, he could not attack them openly. But his presence of mind and military strategems took the place of the assistance he lacked. He disclosed his intention of halting the fugitives and not allowing them to pass through.

Ubashi and his subjects, who had already suffered so many mishaps during their journey, were struck with terror by this hostile move of the Kazaks, and instead of overthrowing their enemy at once, they halted before him and began to take counsel and to reflect, and spent 18 days in complete inactivity. Erali was able to profit from their indecision. While the Kalmuks busied themselves with fruitless deliberations, he gathered around him auxiliaries and allies from all sides to defend himself. Sometimes he indicated the injustice done them by the closeness of the Kalmuks, or else he dazzled them with hopes of the rich booty which would be the reward of victory over a people moving from one land to another with all its wealth and a large number of women.

[162] Ubashi, who saw the forces of his enemies constantly increasing, completely lost his courage and instead of fighting

[163 cont.]
He soon saw that the behavior of his predecessors toward the Kazaks had produced general misfortune, and that until this people was brought to reason by force of arms it would not stop tormenting his subjects. He acted in accordance with this political fact and assembled an army with which he attacked the Great Horde in 1798 (1). Luck was with him and he won great victories

1. See the unpublished journal of Pospelov, who was in Tashkent in 1800.

over the oppressors in the first battles. Encouraged by these fortunate beginnings, he continued to pursue them and added to the force of arms punishments which could only be conceived by the imagination of an exasperated Asiatic. He had the prisoners decapitated and formed pyramids of these heads in the sight of the enemy army. These frightful sights struck the hearts of the Kazaks with inexpressible terror. Lacking true courage and being accustomed to fighting only for pillage, they could not unanimously resolve to die to avenge the blood of their brothers. They dreaded slavery, and this fear obliged them to submit to Iunus Khodja.

Having thus proved the superiority of severity and decision, this prince seized from the Kazaks all the villages which were in their power and not only demanded complete submission in the future but also reparations, according to Asiatic custom, for the pillage and murder done against the residents of Tashkent. Finally he prescribed rules for their litigations and made them pay a tribute of one sheep out of every hundred. In a word, he reduced them completely to the state of subjects, and later he put them in his armies like his own subjects.

We repeat, however, that he did not subjugate the entire [164] Great Horde, for many Kazaks, even among those neighboring him, escaped his power. Several thousand tents retreated to the Irtysh River and joined the Middle Horde, while others gained the Ak-Tau Mountains with their troops, and still others various other places.

The Kazaks who had become subjects of Iunus Khan remained under the domination of Tashkent as long as this city, with the lands which belonged to it, including Turkestan, did not fall under

[192 cont.]
their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai, returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add, by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet, could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193] and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor. But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

[202 cont.]
×648 [726] their attacks on the borders while he, fearing to come near the Ural River, found a way in the heart of his deserts to avenge himself upon the Russians who had retained his son. First he robbed a caravan going from Astrakhan to Khiva, which had the misfortune to pass through his lands. Later he stopped the journey of Lieutenant Gladyshev, who was going from Orenburg to the Karakalpaks. Nor was he satisfied with robbing the Karakalpak envoys who had come from St. Petersburg and were accompanying Gladyshev, but he even seized the imperial letter which was entrusted to them (1).

[739]

1. It is worthy of note that in his journal Gladyshev speaks of having found an English merchant named Djake [Jack?] with the Little Horde in 1742, and that he bought various articles from him in order to present them to the Karakalpaks as gifts.

×648 721 This conduct strengthened the Russian government in their intent to punish the Kazaks through the Volga Kalmuks, inasmuch as the quarrels of these two peoples and their raids upon each other had become more intense at this time. Consequently, on April 24, 1744, Dunduk Dash, deputy of the Kalmuk khanate was presented with a letter patent commanding him to collect as many armed Kalmuks as possible, who would receive powder and shot at Astrakhan, would march against the Kazaks, and would act under the orders of the governor of Orenburg, Nepluev. By way of recompense, the Kalmuks were promised all the plunder they could take from the Kazaks, except for elders and their children. This letter, out of precaution as much as through confidence in [203] Nepluev, was sent to him directly instead of to the horde, so that he could use it if it were indispensable. It is not known what he thought of such a decisive measure, but this letter remained at Orenburg, and the original is still preserved in the archives of the Border Commission.

[204 cont.]
this he used threats and favors by turns, and finally he bought various Russian articles at his own expense which he had sold to the horde, not only without profit but even at a loss.

Although the circumstances were so opposed to the views of the Russian government, yet the hereditary and inveterate hate of the Kazaks for the Dzungars still had enough power to keep them from being entirely indifferent to the hints of the Russians. They preferred to leave their border in peace rather than neglect the opportunity to attack their perpetual enemies, who at this time threatened to reduce them to complete subservience. In spite of their submission to Galdan Tsyren, the khans and sultans feared his domination more than that of the Russians. However, they took part with the people in the preparations for hostilities which were being made. The tribes of the Middle Horde, who were still suffering from the ravages committed against them in 1741, almost under the walls of Orenburg, were the most anxious to help the Russian troops. They were only waiting for the opening of war between them and the Dzungars, and at the first news of the beginning of hostilities they would have thrown themselves upon the settlements of their enemies with all the fury of semi-primitive people. But their hopes were dashed, for the Dzungars, in spite of their threats, left Russia in peace. This was the only way the Kazaks could have avoided the storm which threatened them, for in spite of all the patience with which the Russian government had borne their raids on the border for more than a year, it had been firmly decided to use the troops [205] stationed on the Orenburg line and others to be added to them in order to punish the Kazaks severely.

During the interval, Sultan Khodja Akhmet, who until then had been detained as hostage in the fort at Sarachinsk, was transferred to St. Petersburg. Although Abulkhair could not have been happy to see his son taken further away when he wished him closer, and although he was furiously angry with Nepluev and allowed himself new violence in his relations with him, still his subjects

[205 cont.]
made no raids during the year 1745. Rychkov says (1), according

1. The continuation of his history of Orenburg.

to a Russian Cossack who was with the Little Horde then, that this year as in 1773, Khan Abulkhair incited his subjects to renew their raids on the right bank of the Ural, but on this occasion the people refused to obey. However we cannot accept this report as accurate for the following reasons:

1. The Kazaks were too accustomed to pillage to refuse the proposal of their khan to attack a foreign country, especially when they had not had a chance to test the force of its arms.

2. At that time Abulkhair's attention was directed to Khiva, whose inhabitants, attacked by those of Turkestan, had sent to him to ask help, and who although subjects of Persia wanted to have Sultan Nurali as khan later. He sent Nepluev the letters he had received from Khiva on this subject and asked his advice.

3. It was at this time that he swore an oath of loyalty in his aoul in the presence of a Russian officer, to Emperor Peter III, successor to Elizabeth, and afterwards liberated 30 prisoners, Russians as well as Kalmuks, who had been taken by his subjects.

4. He complained about Nepluev to the highest authorities (2),

2. See Abulkhair's letter and Nepluev's rescript of September 17, 1745 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and indicated that except for his personal quarrel with this governor and the displeasure he had felt at the refusal to exchange [206] his son Khodja Akhmet for Chingis, he had no other cause for complaint against Russia nor any harmful intention.

As for the office of khan which had been proposed to the son in Khiva, Nepluev had sought by all possible means to persuade

[208 cont.]
100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

Y 648 [562] [213 cont.]

which was an absolutely extraordinary distinction among a people accustomed to treating their women as slaves, for they are not allowed to take any part in public affairs.

[562] was brought to the knowledge of the court, and when Djanibek returned to the horde, he delivered a letter to her from the [431] Chancellor, accompanied by a piece of precious brocade from the Empress.

● [721] At the same time as Nurali's election it was learned in St. Petersburg that the Dzungars, at the instigation of Sultan Barak, wished to attack the Little Horde. Although it was later proved that this rumor was false, measures were nevertheless taken to protect the horde from attack.

648 643 At Nepluev's invitation, Khan Nurali arrived near Orenburg in the month of July, 1749, escorted by the most distinguished sultans and elders and many commoners. He stopped on the left bank of the Ural River, where a camp had been prepared in advance in order to make a ceremony of his elevation with éclat. Like his father, he was received at the camp with the firing of cannon and with music. The ceremony began with the reading of the letters patent given to him and to his people. Next he was presented with a robe, a cap, and a saber sent by the court. Finally, the new khan knelt and swore an oath of fealty to Russia upon the Koran.

We will not give the details of this ceremony here, because they were repeated at every new elevation, and we will describe it elsewhere in the article on the customs and ceremonies of the Kazaks (2).

2. See Part III [this particular section on customs not translated].

X 648 [564] [214] Having become the khan, Nurali demonstrated that he would not be content with the title but also wished to have the authority. His first request to the Russian government was to

[219 cont.] In 1750 he only requested the Orenburg authorities, through his envoys, that the Russian caravans proceeding to Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara should pass through his pasture lands, and he undertook to escort them and defend them. In order to give this proposal greater force, his son, Khan Kaip, sent a deputy charged with bearing assurances of peace and amity and also the request that the caravans be sent by way of the auls of his father. This wish of Batyr and his son could not be fulfilled because it tended to do an obvious wrong to Nurali, who in his capacity as a vassal of Russia and a khan recognized by her was [220] in charge of protecting Russian trade in the steppes between the Ural River and the Syr [Darya] and had already undertaken this task.

It is true that one could scarcely count upon his efforts, but the Sultan Batyr's promises presented still less security in view of his distance from the Russian border. For this reason he was answered that the obligation of escorting the caravans across the lands of the Kazak Little Horde was under the jurisdiction of Nurali, that he could help in this, and finally that he was to live on good terms with Nurali if he wished to enjoy Russian protection.

The envoy from Khiva received a reply from Nepluev which contained nothing decisive but was, nevertheless, very honest.

These measures, without regard to their justice, were based on the benefits to Russia. She had to protect and even augment the power of the khans she had installed or recognized, for their weakness would not produce or even promise any use for her. At that time the Kazak hordes had been numbered among her subjects for nearly 20 years. For nearly 20 years she had been losing money in keeping them peaceful, presenting gifts to the sultans and elders, building forts and maintaining troops. Yet, in spite of all these sacrifices, she had been unable during this interval to protect her borders from pillage, nor even to find a way of rescuing her native subjects from the fetters of a people who had submitted to Russia voluntarily. Abulkhair's excuses as to his lack of power, expressed rather rarely because of his vanity, were regarded as subterfuges, as much because of his knavish character as of his

[220 cont.]
open disobedience. Nurali's declarations and his oft repeated requests to use reprisals on the borders by seizing bandits or their kinsmen were more sincere than was believed at the beginning, and later they were taken into consideration. They were also confirmed by the opinion of Tevkelev, who had had experience in relations with the Asiatics, as well as the replies of several sultans who had been requested, like the Khan, with no success over [221] several years, to give up their Russian prisoners. There were also the examples of Khiva, the land of Bukhara, and other powerful states who regarded reprisals (baranta) as indispensable in order to restrain a nomadic people.

Convinced by its experience and seeing that indulgent patience was far from lessening the temerity of the Kazaks, but indeed increased it, the Russian government finally decided to behave toward this people in the same manner as did all their other neighbors. Thus the border authorities were given orders (1)

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 27, 1749.

that in case of theft or the carrying off of persons they should require the Khan to release at once what was missing, and if he refused satisfaction or advised that reprisals be taken, they should take advantage of the first favorable opportunity to seize one of the kinsmen of the guilty person, or even any individual of his tribe (assuming that the guilty person himself did not show himself to the Russians again), and to hold this person under careful guard until the prisoner or the stolen objects should be returned.

This measure was not in harmony with the principles of equity customary among civilized peoples, but it was indispensable with the nomad brigands.

During this same period, in order to oblige Nurali to carry out the requests of the Russian government and to furnish him means of paying for the services his subjects rendered to Russia without injury to himself, he was assigned an annual stipend. At the same time a rule was set to send various gifts of fixed amounts in the name of the border government. But it was

[221 cont.]
ordered that these stipends were not to start being paid until he had returned all the Russian prisoners and the Volga Kalmuks, or at least most of them. It was supposed that this would be carried out soon, but it turned out completely otherwise, and Nurali did not receive his stipends until five years after they had been assigned to him.

[222] At the beginning of 1750, Sultan Aichuvak, brother of the Khan, devised a plan, together with his father's friends, Batyr Djanibek, and a numerous band, composed partly of people of the Middle Horde but mostly made up of members of the Little Horde, to attack a people who lived near the Aral Sea and who were called the Aral people. These people were few in number and unaccustomed to war. One can easily guess that Aichuvak and his accomplices were successful in their enterprise and that they returned home with a large number of prisoners, studs of strange horses, and with many objects of different kinds which they had seized. But the Aral people were subjects of the khan of Khiva, who did not care to let the damage done to them pass without amends. Consequently he took into custody a large number of Nurali's subjects who had come to trade at the market in Khiva, and even his ambassador was arrested. There was no other way of releasing them than to return to the Aral people at least part of what they had lost, and especially the prisoners.

Shortly after this, Sultan Erali, following the example of his brother, attacked the Karakalpaks. But the troops which served as his army were too few, and in place of the booty he hoped for, he was taken prisoner and most of his companions were killed.

After having freed him, at the end of several months, Nurali arrived in Orenburg to see Nepluev and Tevkelev, but his journey did not have any important consequence.

Intercourse between the Middle Horde and Russia rarely took place at that time. Their khan, Abul Mahmet, had retreated to Turkestan where he lived until his death without being heard from; and Barak, as we have said, had been imprisoned /poisoned/. The successors to their power had not yet made the

[222 cont.]
acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Ablai failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to remain on good terms with Russia.

Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde, after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhar Hills.

In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies, which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[226 cont.]
he did not release it until nearly a year had passed. When this caravan returned to Orenburg in 1754, an envoy of Kaip himself accompanied it as well as a Russian officer who had been in Khiva. The latter declared that he had met Sultan Erali on his way and that this prince had begged him to report to Nepluev that he and his brothers were ready to attack Khiva to avenge the insults of Sultan Batyr and his son, and that he planned to join the discontented subjects of Kaip, to put him to death, to seize his place, and to release the Russian prisoners who were then in Khiva. He asked only that in case he were unsuccessful Russia would promise to ransom him if he himself were taken.

To everyone's great astonishment the envoy from Khiva, instead of carrying out his master's orders, complained to the Russian government of the avidity and injustices of the Khan. He described the evils he made the people suffer, and in the name of all the Uzbeks, the people [race] to whom he belonged, he demanded help in order to dethrone the Khan.

Although this demand provided Russia with an opportunity to punish the Khivans for their perfidy and their prince for his insolence the year before in detaining a caravan from Orenburg, nevertheless the government then thought the conquest of Khiva more difficult than it was useful. Moreover Erali's pledge provided hope for acquiring some influence over this land without bloodshed. Consequently the government refused to acquiesce to the proposal of the Khivan envoy, who [227] had solicited help in overthrowing Kaip, but did not forbid him to ask help from the Kazak princes (1). Khan Nurali and Sultan Erali were

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1755.

permitted to march against Khiva and to seize it if luck was on their side. Also it was decided to grant Erali his ransom if he happened to be captured on this expedition.

Russia would certainly have gained an enormous advantage commercially if Abulkhair's sons had carried out their plan and

[227 cont.]
had been successful in seizing Khiva. But unfortunately they did not even start toward the realization of the end proposed by Erali. The reason for this inaction was no doubt the insufficiency of the troops they could have opposed to the forces of Kaip and his father together.

Prince Maksiutov, the captain sent at that time from Orenburg to the Little Horde, wrote in his reports that Nurali Khan and his brothers were preparing to march against Khiva and convoked an assembly of the people who approved of the plan. But when a khoja, who as a kind of saint had been asked for a blessing for the success of the expedition, forbade them to make war against the Khivans, they obeyed him. The Middle Horde then suffered from the last exertions of the Dzungars. In 1754 they found themselves so harassed by the latter that a large number of Kazaks of this horde asked the government to allow them to pass their women and children over the Russian lines if they could not be allowed this permission themselves. Some of them went so far as to ask that they be granted lands on the border, where they promised to engage in agriculture and to build villages.

Such a guard would have been too unsafe, and it would even have been dangerous to allow the wives and children of the Kazaks to enter the forts. Thus the governor of Siberia was directed to pay no attention to [228] such demands (1). Shortly

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 317, 1755.

after this, part of the Middle Horde once more asked to be received under the protection of the forts. This time, because of the remonstrances of Nepluev and also because it wished to treat the Kazaks favorably, the government allowed them to live as nomads near the Uisk line and directed that in case they were attacked they were to be allowed to cross within the Russian border, but with hostages taken from them to guarantee their peacefulness.

This favor, which was granted them at the end of 1756,

[230 cont.]
x 648 of prince and a calendar [sic] in which the conditions were stated by which he was recognized as a vassal.

[726] While Ablai and the weak sultans of the Middle Horde, who were his partisans, ravaged Dzungaria with their subjects, the Little Horde was fighting its coreligionists, the Bashkirs. An [721] offense committed by the former produced such a hatred between the two peoples that it has not been entirely eliminated today. In order to describe this event better, we will present a picture of the condition of the Bashkir country at this time.

[669] This people, which had been under Russian domination since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, had often raised the standard of revolt and had been punished for so doing. The misfortunes which caused the revolt of 1735 had scarcely ended in 1742. In spite of the difficult circumstances of this land, which for those seven years had had to mourn the loss and the sufferings of many of its inhabitants, the survivors did not remain quiet for long. On May 18, 1755 they revolted once more. Mutiny broke loose at once and began with the massacre of all the Russians to be found in the country, not only on the same day but almost at the same hour. This revolt was incited by the letters of a [793 721] mullah named Batyr Shah, who reproached the Moslem faithful for obeying Christians and implored every believer in God and Mohammed to take arms, assuring them that those who died [775] in this holy dispute would receive the eternal rewards promised by the Koran. Similar letters were also sent to the Kazan Tatars [726] and the Kazak hordes. The latter took advantage of the occasion and began at once to make raids across the Russian borders under the pretext of supporting the Bashkirs.

The position of the Orenburg line then became extremely critical. It extended over a length of more than 1,000 versts; it was separated from the settlements in the interior and was surrounded by the Bashkirs in the north and [231] the Kazaks in the south. Most of the so-called fortresses and fortified posts had no fortifications at all. The garrisons were weak. In a word, at the slightest reverse all the residents along the border could perish, excepting those defending the fortress of Orenburg.

[232 cont.]

circumstances, and Nepluev, who had finally received the orders he had requested for the execution of his plan, at once informed the Khan, the Kazak sultans, and the most distinguished elders that as a reward for their faithfulness and devotion to Russia, the Empress was presenting them, as a gift, all the wives and daughters of the Bashkirs who were among them, on condition that the men be surrendered on the line, or at least driven out of the Kazak hordes. In addition, other rewards were promised for the extradition of the deserters.

The voluptuous Kazaks hastened to seize the women who were being abandoned to them. The Bashkirs wished to defend their families, but their number was too small and they could not resist. Some of them perished on the spot, others were surrendered to the Russians, and still others returned by themselves to their homes, waiting impatiently for the time to carry out their firm resolve to avenge this offense perpetrated by the Kazaks.

Rage and jealousy immediately aroused bands of avengers among the Bashkirs, who requested permission from the government to cross the Ural. Nepluev replied that the Empress did not grant permission to cross the border, but in secret he gave orders to the commanders of the forts and military posts to pay no attention to the people who crossed without permission into the steppes beyond the [233] Ural. Taking advantage of the pretended negligence of the guards, whole bands of Bashkirs crossed the Ural, fell upon the hordes, and began to pillage and massacre and to take away women and children.

Khan Nurali complained; he received the reply from Orenburg that the Kazaks had brought all these misfortunes upon their own heads by receiving the faithless deserters in their villages, and that all the Bashkirs were going to hasten to make similar exploits. Then Nurali's subjects took arms and began to repulse the attacks of their enemies, which the latter repeated constantly. The two people continued to destroy each other in this manner until Nepluev decided that it was fitting to call a halt to these disturbances. It was then strictly forbidden to the Bashkirs to cross the Ural, and it was suggested to the Kazaks that they retreat to

[234 cont.]
x648 government took notice of it and gave orders, by way of reward (1),

1. By an ukase of August 25, 1755, the Khan was given a letter patent on this subject.

to begin to give Nurali the stipend which he had been assigned five years before and which had been withheld because he had not delivered the Russian prisoners. Later, as a favor, he was also granted permission to send kinsmen or the most distinguished of the sultans or elders to the court every two or three years. [431 661] These trips entailed, on the one hand, advantages and gifts to the Khan and his deputies, and on the other hand, they were useful to the government. During their stay at court, the envoys could serve as hostages, and as they became acquainted with the laws, customs, and habits of Russia during this sojourn, it was possible that they might become accustomed to it and spread information within the horde about the Europeans.

● [721 726] The hatred and mutual hostility between the Bashkirs and the Kazaks saved many Russians from certain destruction by preventing their alliance. However this did not assure [235] peace on the border. The Bashkirs were burning with a desire for vengeance, and in spite of being forbidden to cross the Ural, they never ceased to raid the pastures of their enemies and to ruin them. Likewise the Kazaks never stopped pursuing and punishing these fiery enemies to the very center of their land. Once they had entered this region across the border, they fought the guards and pillaged the Russian settlements on their return, and these events were frequent. Although the Khan and sultans had good y648 intentions, they could not calm their subjects. They frankly 578 admitted their lack of power and wrote that the common people even suspected them of maintaining secret liaisons with the Orenburg authorities in order to subject all the hordes to Russia (1).

1. Sultan Aichuvak in his zeal for Russia wrote to Nepluev as early as 1754 that the ordinary Kazaks suspected him and the

[235 cont.]

Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between

2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Eralí and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

[236 cont.]
that its probability be considered and also the basis for it. From information received about the Little Horde from an officer (1)

1. See Prince Urakov's reports of 1757 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

who was sent there for the purpose, it was found out that the Kazaks had had no thought of the Kuban, but that Dunduk Dashi and two other Kalmuk princes had themselves sent confidential agents to Khan Nurali to warn him that the Crimean Tatars intended to attack Russia and to invite him to give them help, as the Kalmuks had themselves decided to do. Nurali had not rejected this proposal, but he had asked that he be warned of the moment when the Tatars would carry out their plan.

This duplicity on the part of Dunduk Dashi and his Kalmuk subjects' eternal hatred of the Kazaks caused the presumption that his real aim was to decide Nurali to march against the Russians and to profit by the absence of a large part of the Little Horde to attack its defenseless auls.

However this is only a presumption, and events did not prove that it was true. For neither the Crimean Tatars nor the Kazaks attacked Russia in 1757, and consequently the Volga Kalmuks had no occasion to help the first nor to destroy the second.

[237] The behavior of the Middle Horde in 1758 disturbed the Russian government more than the rumors of Nurali's alliance with the Crimean khan. Part of this horde had invaded the borders and taken the liberty of carrying off 220 Tatars of the Kuznetsk district as prisoners, people known by the name of Dvoedantsy (this name means "those who pay double tribute, or two tributes"). The Russians and the Dzungars levied tribute on these people at the same time. Another part of the Middle Horde, and this was the largest part, having seized the lands of the Dzungars who had been driven from their country, were coming closer to China and seemed too devoted to that empire.

[238 cont.]

[648] On this matter Khan Nurali was presented /sic/ on March 19, 1758 with a letter patent in the name of the Empress inviting him to act in unity with the Russian troops, because the Chinese had violated the peace and invaded the Siberian border. It is not known why this letter patent was not sent. It is still preserved at Orenburg. It can be seen, however, by the business of that year that Nurali announced to the Russian officer who was sent to him expressly with gifts and orders to induce him orally to second Russia that he consented to wage war against the Chinese and that he would hold himself in readiness to march.

Another officer announced, on his return from the Middle Horde, that Sultan Ablai had also promised to fight for the Russians against the Chinese. To corroborate his promises, Ablai sent two deputies who asserted that he had never acknowledged himself a subject of China but had always remained faithful to Russia and that he had relations with the Chinese and had expressed submission to them only out of fear. Although it was clear that these assurances were false, the authorities intentionally pretended to be persuaded of [239] their sincerity (1), and Ablai not only received praise

1. During this same period, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in one of its papers to the Russian Senate that Sultan Ablai had solemnly acknowledged himself a subject of China.

for his steadfast loyalty to Russia, but received a costly saber as a reward, in the name of the Empress, and he was made to hope for other favors later.

Khan Nurali also received several marks of good will from the Russian government because of his intention to fight the Chinese (2). Thus, when his son who was held hostage in Orenburg

2. Nurali even showed a desire to help the Russians in the war against Persia, although he had no means of carrying out his plan.

[241 cont.]
of Ablai that they be returned, and sent an army to support their demand (1). The appearance of this army threw terror into the

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

Middle Horde. They not only undertook to satisfy the desires of the Chinese government, but a large number of Bashkirs, Barabin Tatars, and Russian prisoners were surrendered on the Russian border.

Nevertheless Russia owed the return of these prisoners less to the terror inspired by the Chinese armies than to the efforts and power of Ablai, who, although he was a subject of two empires, sought for political reasons to prevent his people from making raids into Russia. In addition, this border opposite the Middle Horde was always much more secure than the military line along the Ural River.

Let us return now to the Little Horde, whose khan, together with [242] his brothers, seemed more devoted to Russia than Sultan Ablai.

The Little Horde had not ceased to pillage the settlements along the borders from the beginning of spring until the middle of the summer, because the Volga Kalmuks had carried off much of its livestock during the preceding winter and because the guard along the Ural prevented the Little Horde from going along the Volga to recover its losses. Perhaps this first reason was joined by a second, which was less important but could also have influenced the conduct of the guard. During the autumn of 1759, Khan Nurali had come to Orenburg with his brothers, and the governor who had replaced Nepluev treated them with scant courtesy and, what was even worse, failed to make them any presents. This irritated them to such an extent that they did not wish to take leave of him, and they steadfastly refused to comply with any of his requests.

[242 cont.]

x 648 These moods were constantly increasing the audacity of the Little Horde, and the Khan pleaded as an answer the weakness [579 685] of his power. In this situation an order was sent from St. Petersburg (1) to require the Kalmuks to return the horses they had stolen

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 18, 1760.

and to punish the raids of the Kazaks by sending troops into their lands to find the offenders and to seize their possessions, or at least to arrest their kinsmen. But this was to be done without touching, under any circumstances, those who were strangers to them.

● [721] In 1761 part of the Little Horde attacked the Russian borders again and was again punished by force of arms. The reason for its attacks was the same as that for the year before. The Kalmuks had not returned the stolen horses, and the courtesies which were owed them had not been shown to the Khan and his brothers in Orenburg, although at the beginning of the year they had not taken part in the raids. In the autumn the Sultans Erali and Aichuvak were [579] in such a state of outrage at the behavior toward them [243] that they began to halt the caravans which were returning to Orenburg. Aichuvak even had the intention of withdrawing with the [167] Semirod descent line toward the Chinese border into the lands which had belonged to the Dzungars. In order to keep these two [661] sultans as well disposed toward Russia as they had been earlier, the higher authorities granted annual stipends to each of them in spite of the conduct of the local authorities in Orenburg.

x 648 Because of this state of affairs in the Little Horde and the ambiguous position held by Sultan Ablai, which nevertheless was not harmful to Russia, when Emperor Peter III was elevated to the throne, the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans were sent [662] letters with this information without demanding a new oath from them. It was believed that they would have refused, and it was decided not to carry out this formality until they should be in Orenburg themselves. In order to keep them in a state of

[244 cont.]
x 648 this distinction and paid no more attention to Russian complaints.
[721] His subjects again began their raids against the Volga Kalmuks and later insisted that they be allowed to spend the winter on the right bank of the Ural River. They had been refused this request several times, but the new refusal enraged them so that they wished to pass the border by force to spend the winter in Russia with their herds and studs. This insolence led the Empress Catherine to give
[681] Ubashi, a deputy of the Kalmuk khanate, a letter patent (2) on

2. This letter remained in Orenburg, where it is still preserved.

May 18, 1763 to punish the Kazaks of the Little Horde by force of arms as soon as he received word from the government of Orenburg that part of them had crossed the border. Orders were also given to authorize the Bashkirs and Yaik Cossacks to do the same. But no one gained from this, because the Kazaks remained in their steppes.

The wily Sultan Ablai, who for several years had succeeded in pleasing two powers with opposing interests, was called at this time to the aid of a third, which was less [245] necessary than the first two to his security in the horde but to whose fate he was
x 648 721 linked by both the laws of the Koran and his amour-propre.

The Chinese conquered what is called Little Bukhara almost at the same time as Dzungaria and wished to extend their conquests still further over other small Moslem states of Central Asia. The expectation of this invasion and the impossibility of repulsing it forced the khans of Tashkent and Kokand and their neighbors, who were as weak as they, to beg help against the Chinese first of all from Akhmet, sovereign of the Afghans, for with this title and as a Moslem, he should protect his coreligionists. The inhabitants of Kashgar and Yarkend and other cities already conquered by the Chinese likewise asked him to deliver them from the rule of the infidels. Aroused by so many demands, Akhmet sent a strong army against the Chinese, which halted between Tashkent and Kokand to enter into discussions with the Chinese.

[245 cont.]

[648] [721] During the correspondence and the sending of couriers, the zealous Moslems joined their defenders from all sides, and by letters and sermons they incited everyone to come to their aid. Abul Mahmet, who was regarded as the khan of the Middle Horde, also received a letter of invitation, but since he had ceased to rule the Kazaks long before, he transmitted the invitation to [662] Ablai (1). The latter would no doubt have entered the general

1. The Bashkir, Tergulov, who was sent to the Middle Horde, brought a copy of this letter to Orenburg in the same year of 1763.

league of the Moslems if he had been a little less closely linked to the Chinese. But the court of Peking, in order to forestall his inclinations to help his coreligionists, had sent to Ablai shortly before the arrival of Abul Mahmet's letter a letter patent (2)

2. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev.

which permitted him to occupy the environs of the Ili River and assured him constant protection. But at the same time [246] the [661] court of Peking took as hostage his father-in-law, Sultan Sultanamet, several elders and their children.

[662] It was also proposed to Nurali that he join the Afghans, and he did not categorically refuse. But the position of his horde and the circumstances did not permit him to march with an army toward the Chinese borders. The Kalmuks on one side and the Bashkirs on the other would not have failed to profit by the absence of the Kazaks and would not only have pillaged all their riches but also have carried off their wives and children into slavery. Nurali had reason to fear this, for the Bashkirs retained a vivid memory of the injuries they had suffered in 1755 from the Little Horde, many of which had not yet been avenged. And in 1762 the Kalmuks had suffered another blow from the Kazaks, who had reached the Volga by crossing the Caspian Sea over the ice.

[246 cont.]
This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[248 cont.]
x 648 secure hostages from Ablai to guarantee the freedom of the
[661] Russians sent to him.

x 648 662 Khan Nurali, who was proud of his relations with the army of the Afghans and with China, wrote directly to the Empress in 1764, both to inform her of the invitation sent him by all the Moslems of Central Asia to take part in the war against China and also to acquaint her with the distinguished reception his embassy had had in Peking. These two circumstances inflated his vanity, and in his dreams of [249] his importance, he thought he could exact several concessions which he had already been refused. However, these repeated demands had no more success than they had had the first time. He was sent thanks from Russia for the news he had provided about the Afghans, and several gifts were added with a reply which was as polite as it was lacking in satisfaction. His horde did not remain calm, however, but con-
● [721] tinued its raids against the Volga Kalmuks as much as against the Russian settlements on the border, nor did they renounce their usual dissensions, which are not worth a detailed description. Thus passed the years 1765 and 1766. In 1767 Russian troops punished them in a clear manner, by pursuing the brigands to the very middle of the horde.

x 648 662 643 There is no doubt that this chastisement made Nurali violently angry. Since he needed Catherine's good graces, however, he hid his resentment for a long time. He was afraid that after his death the position of khan might pass to another family, and asked that a successor or deputy be designated while he still lived and that the Russian government ceremonially elevate his eldest son, Ishim, to this new post. This was a new desire, but it was not in opposition to Russian views. It was true that Russia could designate one of Nurali's brothers as khan of the Little Horde if she chose. But since there was no reason then for preferring them above other sultans and since the Empress Anna, when she promised Abulkhair to preserve the post of khan for posterity, did not fix any rule for the choice of his successors, Nurali's wish could be fulfilled. Also the particular qualities of Sultan Ishim were no obstacle to the accomplishment of his

K [250 cont.]
K 648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[152 578] [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K [661] Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indis-
pensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be
given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with
him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his
request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was
even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was
directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the
hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to
maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 16, 1770.

thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes
of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia,
offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he
saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused
on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.
K
● [721] The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the
Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2)

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg, received on January 10, 1771 an order from the Empress to send troops into the Kazak steppe in order to punish the bandits and free the prisoners.

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167
upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate
enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks,
which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destina-
tion to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks
and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

EK KO 648 K 648 EK KO [667] 668

[253 cont.]
after having taken counsel with the princes and the lamas (priests), he fixed the time of departure for the time when the Volga should be covered with ice. This arrangement was necessary because, although Ubashi himself was on the left bank of the river, a large part of the Torguts were on the right bank and could not join him with what they possessed except by crossing the ice.

This is why a [254] large part of the inhabitants of Astrakhan are still composed of Kalmuks today. For the winter of 1770 was warm and the rivers of southern Russia did not freeze, and Ubashi, after waiting in vain until the month of January for the Kalmuks from the right bank to join him, was obliged to abandon them and to leave with only those who were on the left bank.

They departed on the fifth of January, numbering 30,000 tents (1).

1. This is what Rychkov's journal says, but the Geographical Dictionary of the Russian Empire puts it at only 28,162.

K EK KO [662]

As they approached the Yaik /Ural River/, the governor of Orenburg warned Khan Nurali that they were going to attack the Kazaks. Consequently, in the name of the supreme government, he granted Nurali the right to fight against them and to take as much booty from them as he could, on condition that they then be made to return to their former places of abode within our borders. The government of the borders of Siberia transmitted the same advice to the Middle Horde through Sultan Ablai and other chiefs. In order to confirm these declarations, on January 27, 1771 an imperial letter patent was presented in the name of Nurali and all the Kazak people to seize the Torguts.

EK KO K ● [721] 186

Every kind of instigation or advice was quite superfluous for the accomplishment of such designs. Every Kazak considered the chance to contribute to their execution a special bit of good fortune. Stirred with a violent hatred for all the Kalmuk descent groups, a heritage from their fathers and their most distant

European KalmyK RF4
Kalmyks (oirat) AHS

KK 648 [721 186] EK KO 648 [721 186]

[254 cont.]

ancestors, they hastened out to fight against them and despoil them. In less than a month the Kazak hordes were under arms, and the entire length of the country, from the shores of the Yaik to the borders of China, was covered with bands of warriors waiting impatiently for the appearance of a people whom the Kazaks burned to immolate for injuries suffered and for the hatred they aroused simply by their name and their origin. Nurali replied to the letter patent that he was not only ready to comply [255] with the wishes of the Russian government but that he was already on the march with his subjects against the fugitives. At the same time news was received that Ablai and his horde were ready for combat. Aichuvak and other sultans wrote in the same vein, and Kaip, who had been khan of Khiva and who lived within the Little Horde after his expulsion by his subjects, promised to join the Russian troops. East of the Kazak steppes, the Kalmuks were awaited by the Sultans Abulfenz, son of Abulkhair Khan, and Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, and finally by the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, who surpassed all the neighboring peoples in daring and ferociousness.

EK KO K [721 167]

What a terrible series of battles the Torguts had to endure! What a succession of attacks, murders, and robberies occurred on their route all the way to their destination on the banks of the Ili, traveling not with an army always ready to fight, but taking along with them their wives, children, herds, and all their possessions!

Several detachments of Russian troops were immediately detailed to restrain the Kazaks, but various circumstances prevented them from acting in a manner which corresponded to the hope of the government. From then on all hope was lost of seizing the Kalmuks, and the arming of all the Kazak hordes served only to exterminate a large part of the Torguts, without contributing in any way to their return to Russia.

The first barrier which should have been opposed to them was the army of the Ural (Yaik) Cossacks, whose lands they crossed. After the Kalmuks had passed, the Cossacks were firmly ordered to pursue them, but they rebelled and openly refused to leave their homes.

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[255 cont.]

A second detachment was composed of Orenburg Cossacks. They entered the Kazak steppe and joined Khan Nurali in the first half of February. But their horses were so exhausted by the lack of fodder that this [256] detachment remained in the rear and was finally forced to pass into Russia.

Regular troops were detailed to replace them. But the same lack of forage in the steppes beyond the Ural River during the winter and the loss of precious time in correspondence and preparations prevented this corps under the command of Major General Traubenberg from leaving the fortress of Orsk until April 12. He was directed to join Khan Nurali and to await the Kalmuks on the Irtysh, but he did not reach this river until they were already on the Turgai. Having thus lost the opportunity of action in any other way than against the rear of the fugitives, the Russians who had joined the troops of Nurali (1) and Kaip (2) marched swiftly

1. On this occasion Nurali paraded his devotion to Russia in the presence of the commander of the Russian troops and complained of the fact that they had not asked his help in the Prussian War or the one against Turkey.

2. Nurali effected his meeting with the Russian troops near the Aksakal Barbi lakes, and Kaip did so on the Karaganly-Turgai, 754 versts /805 km./ from the fort of Orsk.

in pursuit of the Torguts. Near the Ulu-Tau Mountains famine and bad water caused swelling ailments to spread among the soldiers, and the horses tired and began to die in large numbers. Meanwhile the fugitives were moving farther and farther away, and the impossibility of reaching them became more evident every day. Finally, General Traubenberg was obliged to turn from the east to the north and to return into Russia by the fort of Uisk, which was the nearest point on the border.

European KalmyK RF4
KalmyKs (direct) AN5
CossacKs RD2

xK 648 721 167 EK KO 648 721 167

[256 cont.]

The Kazaks alone could not seize the Kalmuks, and they did not need to. The aim of their cooperation was better accomplished by their endless and repeated attacks, their pillaging and the capture of a large number of prisoners. Sultan Aichuvak routed one section on the Sagiz. Nurali delivered a violent blow to another section toward the east, and he also carried off several victories over them near the Mugodzhar Hills and on the Ishim River. Ablai [257] fought them with constant success. In some regions he acted in accord with Sultan Abulfenz, and their united forces caused immense losses to the Kalmuks, especially through the number of prisoners they took.

Erali, sultan of the Great Horde and at the same time paladin of the court of Peking, invited Ablai to join him against the Kalmuks several times. The latter refused to aid him, but this did not stop him from carrying out the plan he had devised. Erali found other allies and caused the fugitives to undergo enormous losses in men, animals, and personal belongings. We saw the details of this event in the historical account of the Great Horde.

When they were finally free of the Kazaks, the Kalmuks fell into the hands of the Buruts, and the misfortunes which the latter inflicted upon them were much worse than those they had suffered previously, particularly with regard to losses in prisoners. The Buruts, who were as greedy as they were ferocious, pursued them all the way to the Chinese border, to the new line established on the lands of the Dzungars. Ubashi crossed this line, not as he had imagined when he left the Volga as an independent sovereign, but as a humble subject who wished to save his life. He brought to China less than half of the Kalmuks who left Russia with him, the rest having perished en route.

K 648 669 662 C 648 669 662

In 1773 and 1774 Pugachev's revolt caused violent agitation in the provinces in the southeast of Russia. The lands washed by the Ural River, almost from its source to its mouth, were most exposed to this, because the Yaik Cossacks were the first accomplices of the false Peter, and the Bashkirs were his first allies. The troops forming the border guard assembled in the principal forts to defend them against the rebels, and the borders remained

[260 cont.]

subject on December 17, 1775, the geodetic specialist Vasiliev drew a map of the environs of the Emba and the rivers which flowed into it.

execution, as had all the others which had been made previously.

[721] It can be seen in the reports from the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorf, to the Empress in the months of March and April, 1776 that the Little Horde had once more begun acts of hostility against Russia, and although after the Russian troops entered the steppes in 1774, the border authorities had been forbidden to send troops beyond the Ural, yet Khan Nurali himself had asked for armed assistance to bring his restless subjects to their senses.

[642] Sultan Ablai, on the contrary, was then becoming more powerful, older, and wilier from day to day. Having had more experience than any of the contemporary Kazak princes and being known for his intelligence, dreaded by his subjects, and distinguished for his ties with the empress of Russia and the emperor of China (2) /sic/,

2. The best known among them was Sultan Dair, son of Barak, who complained to the governor of Orenburg that Ablai had unjustly usurped the title of khan.

he had every possible right to the post of chief of the Middle Horde. Sure of his ability, he knew how to attract followers by his importance and his prudent behavior. He threatened his enemies with his power and acknowledged himself now a subject of Russia and now that of China (3), depending on the occasion,

3. Some Kazaks who came within our borders stated that Ablai spoke Chinese.

being in fact a completely independent sovereign. One can notice this especially after the year 1771, when he made less

[643] effort to conserve appearances of an external submission to Russia, and having become less hypocritical, he openly took the title of khan.

[261 cont.]

643 643 deliver the objects. Ablai did not wish to swear a new oath of loyalty even under this condition. He believed that the demand that was being made for these [262] external signs of submission had the goal of rendering him suspect to the Chinese, to whom he was then particularly attached. For this reason all the proposals which Russia made him were fruitless, and the certificate and the marks of the position of khan remained at the fort of Petropavlovsk, opposite which he lived in the house which the Russian government had had built for him.

648 662 Ablai's disobedience became more patent when the Russian government turned down his request for aid in men to make war against the Buruts, and he openly refused to return the Russian prisoners in his horde, as well as the Turkmen whom the Kalmuks had taken away from the Astrakhan government in their flight and who had remained with the Kazaks. The government was justly annoyed by Ablai's audacity and insolence, and withdrew his stipend and sought to humble him by supporting one of the sultans among his enemies. Measures had even been taken to this effect, and it was thought for a moment to take him prisoner [721] and send him into the interior of Russia. But at this time he assembled troops, attacked the Buruts, delivered a severe defeat to them, took hostages from them, and returned to nomadize in the environs of Turkestan.

648 [361] While he was living there, he built a house surrounded by a rampart on the little river Talash, near the Ulu-Tau Mountains for his son, Sultan Hadil, and at the entreaty of his Kazak subjects of the Great horde, he founded a village nearby, which he populated with Karakalpaks who were accustomed to agriculture. As [166] for the Buruts he had captured, he made them go north of the Middle Horde, where they are still living today with their children, making up the tribe of the Djany or Iany-Kirgiz, which means New Kirgiz.

[764] In 1781 Ablai returned toward the Russian frontier, but he died on the way at the age of 70 and was buried in Turkestan. As soon as this news arrived in Peking, the Chinese government

[262 cont.]
sent a [263] high officer to the horde, who joined the family of the deceased and celebrated a ceremonial funeral service in its presence.

Thus ended Ablai's relations with Russia. Although the disobedience of this prince in the last years of his life was open, yet it had no important consequences. The Little Horde, whose khan seemed entirely devoted to Russia and proved this by his actions, was much more disturbing to the borders, as it continued its raids and brigandage as usual. As we saw earlier, in 1775 the Empress had forbidden the sending of troops beyond the Ural to chastise the Kazaks, and although not only the Orenburg authorities but the Khan himself had asked that this measure be employed again in 1776, it was not done. The supreme government had made up its mind to substitute gentle means for severity. This system, which was so favorable to the Kazaks, did not last long. Their plundering forced it to be changed. Nurali himself again declared the absolute urgency of punishing the guilty persons. As a result, on October 4, 1779, the Empress gave orders to the governor of Orenburg, by a rescript, not only to pursue the bandits with armed force, but, as before, to seize their kinsmen if necessary, or even their neighbors, so that the families of these neighbors would make an effort to deliver the guilty persons or at least to force the return of the Russians who had been held prisoner.

According to tradition, the southern part of the Middle Horde underwent a terrible defeat from the Great Horde after Ablai's death, being attacked and having many animals taken away. Those who had suffered did not remain quiet but avenged themselves upon their enemies. The northern part of the Middle Horde took no part in these reprisals. This horde chose as the successor to Ablai his son Vali, and the latter esteemed the protection of Russia and did not wish to be at odds with her. As a result he asked her to [264] confirm his new position. His request was fulfilled, and in 1782 he was proclaimed the khan of the Middle Horde by Lieutenant General Jacobs in the fort of Petropavlovsk. The ceremonies observed on this occasion were the same as those which the Russian government observes at every installation of a khan. We have already spoken of them.

[264 cont.]

X 48 The election of Vali by Ablai's Kazak subjects and his con-
643 firmation by Russia did not prevent another khan from appearing in the same horde. He was chosen by the Naiman descent line and confirmed by the emperor of China. The descendants of the ancient Naimans, who had blended into the mass of the Kazak people of the time, obeyed, at the time of Ablai, Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet and brother of Pulat, the khan of Turkestan. And although he had had some relations with the Orenburg authorities and had even requested a stipend, he was nevertheless a subject of China. He died in 1783, leaving a son named Bupu and a son-in-law, Khan Khodja, son of Barak, whose acquaintance we have already made. One of these princes was to inherit Abulfenz's authority, but each had his partisans, who could not come to an agreement on the choice and who set the entire Naiman descent group in commotion with their quarrels. The majority of the votes were in favor of Khan Khodja, however, so that this prince became the sovereign of the former subjects of Abulfenz, and the troubles were ended. When the emperor of China learned this, he sent him a certificate as khan by one of his high officials. The ministry in Peking considered this a necessary measure because it regarded the entire Middle Horde as subjects of China and because it had named Ablai a Chinese prince. When it was seen that Ablai's son Vali was submitting
[662] himself to Russia, he was speedily replaced, for the dignity of the empire, by another Kazak prince who was submissive.

X 48 With the exception of Vali, the other sons and close kinsmen of Ablai had few relations with Russia. Some of them proudly acknowledged themselves to be subjects of China.

This was the behavior adopted by Sultan Chingis, who [265] marched in 1784 with an army raised in the steppes to put down a revolt which had broken out in Tashkent. Another brother of
[186] Khan Vali, Sultan Tyz, who was also devoted to China, is known to us only for his hatred of the Buruts.

Tyz was not the only one to attack his bloodthirsty neighbors.
● [721] Several sections or branches of the Kazaks who lived near the Chinese borders continued to maintain the war against the Buruts

[265 cont.]
x 648 begun by Ablai. But the Buruts, who were accustomed to con-
[721] stant fighting, were not easy to defeat. The Chinese also experienced the effects of their valor several times and sometimes were vanquished by them. Thus it is not surprising that Sultan Tyz, who rashly attacked them with a handful of men, was
[727 728] defeated and taken prisoner, and he emerged from prison only under humiliating conditions and after giving them the slaves which belonged to him.

[721] The elder Berdy Khoja suffered still more from the Buruts (1). He ruled the part of the Middle Horde which

1. This same Berdy Khoja came to the fort of Semipalatinsk in the month of July, 1785 and imparted the information to the Russians which we have given here about Ablai's son and on the Buruts. This was published for the first time in Sibirskii Vestnik, Bk. III, 1820, and we have taken it from this source.

nomadized near the Chinese borders, and often fought against the savage Kirgiz, winning battles against them frequently. In 1785 he won quite an important victory over them, but it was his last. Acting as an auxiliary of the Chinese army, which was marching against them from the shores of the Ili, he advanced swiftly from the shores of the Ayaguz and gave them a terrible rebuff. Encouraged by his success he set out again with a small number of his men and halted on his arrival at the Jidisse /Djidis?/ to await reinforcements. The Buruts took advantage of his
[727] weakness and attacked him during the first night, defeating him and taking him prisoner. The unfortunate elder, in despair, knowing the customs of his enemies, could no longer hope for good luck in the future, and resolving to hasten his death, he killed one of the Buruts who was [266] leading him to the chief of the tribe. The others could not endure the idea of letting this act pass unpunished for an instant. They stopped on the way

[266 cont.]

[648] and put Berdy Khoja to death in the most barbarous manner. They [727] cut off his head, his feet, and his hands, and then they opened his stomach and put all the dismembered parts into it.

The revenge which was exacted for this execrable assassination showed that if the Kazaks were less valorous than the Buruts, they yielded nothing to them in ferocity. Ak-Kaiak, the brother of Berdy Khoja, and his sons Lepes and Choka, in a fortunate battle with the Buruts, managed to capture the son of the elder of the latter group and to bring him to their village. There the wives of Berdy Khoja threw themselves upon the unfortunate prisoner. Each of them wanted to kill him. It was a question of who would inflict the most wounds upon him, and he finally died under their blows.

[721] Let us return to the Little Horde. It was an object of concern to the Russian government in many respects during the ten years from 1781 to 1791. Above all, the goal of these concerns was to re-establish order and peace, but they had no success and often found themselves obliged to have recourse to arms in order to punish the bandits who never ceased to make raids over the Orenburg border in defiance of all kinds of reproof.

Having firmly resolved to introduce some kind of order among the Kazaks and from there to come little by little to fixed regulations, in 1872 Empress Catherine commanded first, the establishment of a special border administration under the name of the expedition of the borders, whose duty would be to use [233 166] every possible means to carry out Her Majesty's benevolent intentions toward the Kazaks; and second, she abolished the prohibition against allowing the livestock of the Kazaks to enter within the line to spend the winter (1). Third, she gave strict

1. Besides, it is well to note that in spite of this prohibition the Kazaks [267] often crossed the Ural River secretly and came to spend the winter with their animals in the Astrakhan steppes.

[266 cont.]
x648 orders to the authorities to keep [267] constant and vigorous watch upon the maintenance of justice, desiring that they grant the Kazaks every possible protection and help (1). Fourth, large

1. This wish of Empress Catherine was written in her hand, December 27, 1782 on the report from the commander of Orenburg, Lieutenant General Apukhtin.

[316] sums of money were given to build mosques on the borders of Orenburg and Siberia, to which schools and caravansaries were to be attached.

[177] By assembling all these establishments at the principal points of the border, the Empress intended not only to bring the Kazaks closer to the Russians but also to moderate their ways.

Exertions and expenditures were all in vain, for the Kazaks showed not the slightest desire to be civilized. In the [721] following year (1783) they did so much damage with their raids that it was impossible not to use armed force to punish them. Consequently, in the month of February, 1784, a detachment of 3,462 men was sent beyond the Ural River, and when they were unable to find the guilty persons, they seized 43 Kazaks who had [727] not taken any part in the last raids, in order to force them to x648 give up the prisoners. Their kinsmen were exasperated by this 721 injustice and immediately crossed to the right bank of the Ural 726 to avenge themselves. Independently of this attack, the residents along the border were laid waste at other points by Kazaks who were not pillaging for vengeance but for the love of pillage (2). A certain Syrym Batyr stood out among them, and

2. *In 1784 the Kazaks captured 176 Russians,* and 175 in 1786. Who knows how many more they killed?

we will soon point him out as a man chosen to be the instrument of the most important revolutions among the Kazaks. Meanwhile

[267 cont.]
X 648 721 726
we will say that his raids and those of his partisans forced the Russians to send two [268] detachments of troops beyond the Ural. The first was composed of 2,760 men and was sent from the Ural toward the source of the Emba. The second, of 1,250 Cossacks, was sent from Uralik /Uralsk?/ toward the mouth of that same river. Snow prevented these troops from acting according to their instructions, but nevertheless the expedition was not entirely useless. They seized 213 women and children, for [727] whose ransom a large number of Russians who had been captured earlier were given up.

X 648 439 712
It will be understood that such conditions were not of a sort to make caravan trade flourish between Russia and Central Asia. For a long time the khans' promises to protect the caravans had not been believed. Long experience had made their weakness known. Nor could it be hoped to restore the brigands to reason for a long period of time. For this reason means were sought to establish the safety of trade by force of arms. It was proposed, to this end, to build forts on the Emba and Temir rivers and defenses on the route from these two points to Iletsk [Sol-Iletsk], or to set up only one fortification on Mangyshlak [Peninsula] on the Caspian Sea and to send the caravans from Guryev by sea. Thus from Orenburg to Guryev they could follow the route along the Nizhne-Uralsk line in complete safety.

One of these plans was not carried out, partly because of the extraordinary difficulties which had to be surmounted and partly because the old trade routes were very advantageous to the Khivans and Bukharans, for although the new ones would have been safer, they still would not have been entirely safe from attack.

X 648 692
The Orenburg border commission controlled matters pertaining to the Kazaks, or rather it examined all the relations of the government with this people, but it could not study the individual disputes which arose between the residents on the two sides of the line. The [269] Empress, in order to remedy this, conceived the plan of establishing a tribunal in whose operations the Kazaks would take the same part as the Russians, and which would serve them as a school of justice. This at least was what

[269 cont.]
X648 Catherine thought when she signed the ukase on May 2, 1784
692 for the formation of a border tribunal. Under the chairmanship of the supreme commander of Orenburg, it was composed of two clerks, two merchants, and two peasants who were Russians, a Kazak sultan and six Kazak elders, a deputy from the Bashkirs, and one from the Meshcheriaks, Its duty consisted of examining litigation and criminal cases which might take place between the Kazaks and the border residents.

X648 At the same time as this establishment, from which great
[346] advantages were expected, it was ordered to open mosques and schools for the Kazak children (1). The mosques were finished

1. May 2, 1784.

at Orenburg and Troitsk in 1785, and when this news was received, Catherine gave orders (2) to build schools and caravansaries

2. September 4, 1785.

or markets on the same sites without delay.

The persistent concern which this sovereign took in the state of the Kazaks was guided by her close attention to matters concerning them and a perfect knowledge of the real situation of her half-
[177 savage subjects. Their constant banditry did not divert her from
721] the intention of giving them a taste of good organization. On the one hand, she justly forgave them for many signs of insolence, as men who had no idea of the advantages of public order. On the other hand, her clever mind was not slow to discover that the Kazak raids were often no more than just reprisals for the wrongs and violences they had undergone from the Russians on the border, without speaking of the Bashkirs, who often crossed the Ural in defiance of all the prohibitions against it and laid waste their enemies.

X648 [270] Actually, many of the raids were the fruit of vengeance.
721 But the daring undertakings of a powerful band of brigands, which gathered in 1784 near the borders, were not among those which

[270 cont.]
X 648 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under
● 721 the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken.
For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line,
[724] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable
victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent
against them.

X 648 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration
668 of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and
very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it
was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her
ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe
the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable
result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of
governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian
border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the
Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the
[721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding
727] about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an
attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the
work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they
carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The de-
tachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more
daring.

X 648 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first
721 events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in
662 Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali
hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage
was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that
Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was
even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order
[271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for
the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force
and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The
Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and
requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[271 cont.]

All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it because no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several times, as well as of his father. The central government could not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election was put off until more detailed information could be collected concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the Little Horde.

In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into three sections, according to the number of its descent lines, namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the executors of the commands of the supreme head of the government of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in the Little Horde completely and gradually to apply to them the code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[273 cont.]
X 648 privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that
646 the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for
728 his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

X 648 Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand?
643 Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weak-
662 ness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

X 648 [274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other
721 years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which
727 reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of
[439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[274 cont.]
course of these two years fewer prisoners were taken on the border than in the 13 years from 1782 to 1794 (2). Likewise,

2. As proof, we include here the following table for these 13 years. Along the line which extends from the fort of Zverinogolovsk to Guryev, the Kazaks took 34 prisoners in 1782.

21	"	" 1783
176	"	" 1784
175	"	" 1785
12	"	" 1786
2	"	" 1787
43	"	" 1788
53	"	" 1789
90	"	" 1790
34	"	" 1791
40	"	" 1792
60	"	" 1793
42	"	" 1794

in 1786 his subjects released quite a large number of Russians from slavery, up to the time Nurali was banished from the horde after Ufa had been fixed as his place of exile and the detention of his brother Aichuvak at Uralsk. That same year 45,000 tents spent the winter inside the Russian borders and crossed the Ural River again in the spring without permitting the slightest infraction of the peace.

The first effects of the new system of administration of the Little Horde could not fail to be pleasing [275] both to the Empress, who ardently desired to establish order among the Kazaks, and to the supreme commander of the border, who was approaching the goal indicated to him by the advice of his sovereign and who saw the possibility of pleasing her by insuring the prosperity of an entire people. Occupied with these thoughts,

[276 cont.]
he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[279 cont.]

x648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes. [177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been [662 578 643] accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity and once more began their old disputes, driven from one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders [692] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

● [721 662] These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him x648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 771 186 662 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[281 cont.]

X 648 ●721 771 186 662

to all the servants of God and followers of Mohammed who trust in the protection of Our Prophet, to join the Turkish army with goods and with sentiments, and to go and strike the infidels. This is a matter for which a great reward can be obtained. And if in this war anyone fails to do all the harm possible to the infidels, he must fear the great anger of God, and may not hope for the protection of Our Prophet. Besides, we beg that there should be faith in the words of the envoy.

"We learn that you Kazaks do not have your own wise and learned men, and for this reason you cannot carry out the laws of Our Prophet at all. And since the Lord God has commanded that his principles be known and that prayers be offered in conformity to his principles, fasting he observed, and alms be given of one's possessions, then the knowledge of letters in order to read books belongs to the service of God. There is a source of wisdom among us today. For from all the peoples, including the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Arabs, and Turkmen, there are many who study in our schools, but from you, who are such a numerous people, there is not a single student. In the Koran, Our Prophet has prescribed that every believer, not only the husband and the wife, but the small children as well, should study the law and fear God and that when they are able, they should inform others. For this reason we advise you to send here two or three men from each tribe to be instructed. If they will not listen to your urging, then take two or three men from each tribe by force. They will receive their subsistence from us, and when they will have finished their studies and are skillful in the law, they will return to their homes with the principles of piety and the habit of prayers and fasting. And if you have the means of carrying out our proposal, O Kazak people, and leave it without execution, then [282] you will become traitors to God in this world, and on the day of resurrection you will burn in the fires of hell. If we did not offer this truth for your consideration, we ourselves would deserve the name of infidels in this world, and we should expose ourselves in the future world to the eternal fires of hell.

[282 cont.]

"In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities, replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg government. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

[283 cont.]

×648 It was in 1790 that he began to give the strongest proofs of his hatred. But before describing them, we believe it our duty to recall certain regulations made by Empress Catherine for the good of the hordes during the period when the establishment of peace seemed possible there and even close at hand.

[431 423] On August 13, 1786, on the occasion of a demand for a concession of land made by Khudai Mendy, sultan of the Middle Horde, the border authorities were commanded not only to yield it to him as well as to his subjects, but also to give assistance in money as a pure gift to every family which wished to settle.

On July 15, 1788 it was permitted to give land to Kazaks who went into Russia without requiring any confirmation for this.

[87] On February 28, 1789 the staff of the Kazak schools on the Orenburg line were confirmed and the salaries of the teachers and the expense of feeding the students at the cost of the government were settled. It was further commanded that their fathers be given, as encouragement, certificates of praise, gifts, etc.

[42] On April 30, 1789 Baron Igelstrom received an order to compose a plan for a constitution for the Kazaks based on folk customs, habits, and oral laws.

×648 668 Although Russia had already recognized the absolute necessity of re-establishing the position of khan in the Middle Horde, the khan had not yet been elected when Syrym broke every [284] kind of liaison with the governor of Orenburg and declared himself the foremost enemy of the Russians. Not satisfied with having aroused his compatriots and having attacked the inhabitants on the right bank of the Ural River, he sought help in Bukhara and sent agents into that land to this end in 1790. The Khan's atalyk replied that help would be sent, but after a certain time. Meanwhile he advised Syrym to continue his raids on the Russian border. One of the envoys who had received this reply in Bukhara was later taken prisoner by the Ural Cossacks and personally gave the most positive details about his embassy.

×648 646 ●721 In the month of March, 1791 Syrym, hoping to induce the entire Little Horde to invade Russia, convoked a great national assembly at the mouth of the Emba and had letters distributed everywhere to arouse the nation. This undertaking was not fully

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successful, because the sultans, and especially the descendants of Abulkhair, were trying to please the Russian government, having been informed of the Empress' intentions to re-establish the post of khan among them. As for individual raids, Syrym's followers continued them almost without interruption for seven or eight years.

The main raids took place after the election of Sultan Erali to the position of khan, which was in 1791 by order of the Empress. When she learned of Nurali's death, she commanded on January 29 that Erali be named his successor and that he be sent the patent of khan of the Little Horde without waiting for any representations. In carrying out the will of his sovereign, the commander of the province of Orenburg at once informed Abulkhair's son of the honor which was being given him and invited him to appear at the border at the end of summer to receive the ceremonial investiture. Erali arrived at the Ural at the designated time with his followers and on September 4 was proclaimed khan, 15 versts from the fortress of Orsk.

This is how his election took place. On the day at the hour designated, Lieutenant General Peutling, supreme commander of [285] the border region of Orenburg, escorted by a body of troops appeared before the assembled Kazaks and commanded first of all that the imperial document be read to them, in which it was said that Erali had been designated khan, both because of his personal merit and because he was the eldest in Abulkhair's family. Then he invited the people to proceed to the election according to its old customs.

At this same moment there appeared the deputies of Batyr Syrym, those of Sultan Abulgazy Kaip, and those of several elders, who announced that they did not consent to the election of Erali. They received the reply that he had been designated by the wish of the Empress. The next day, after the proclamation of the Khan, that is, September 5, six deputies were chosen who were sent to St. Petersburg to ask that he be confirmed.

On September 6 a letter was received from the khan of Turkestan, Pirali, son of Nurali, in which this prince, who had

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x 648 663 662 that Erali's election was illegal, claiming that Baron Igelstrom had concluded an agreement with the Little Horde by which he had promised, in the name of the government, to remove the descendants of Abulkhair forever from the position of khan. Using every possible weapon against Russia, he did not forget to call the Koran to his aid, pointing out that it is forbidden to Moslems [688] to submit themselves to Christian powers. To this same end he sought, in 1791, to induce the Kazaks to end their barter with the Russians and, if possible, to withdraw into the interior of the steppes. He spread the rumor that he was expecting the Bukharan army which the khan of that country had promised him. He sent his son to Khiva in 1793 to ask for similar aid, and although he received a flat refusal, he boasted nevertheless of the success of the embassy. In 1792 he addressed an extremely insolent letter to Peutling, chief of the viceroyalty of Ufa, in which it was not enough to insult him by the most coarse expressions, but the Empress was attacked as well. Finally, in his
● [721 726] rage, he solemnly declared war against Russia. The results of this declaration were several new raids by bandits, made by Syrym upon Ilezkoi [Iletski] Gorodok [now Ilek], Fort Kalmuk, and various other places on the Iletsk line.

x 648 Khan Erali could not make his enemy see reason, and therefore in 1792 he demanded that troops be sent to the horde to punish the offenders. The Empress did not grant this request. Rightly contemptuous of Syrym's malicious intentions, she [287] did not wish to spill the blood of the Kazaks, especially since the severe defeat they had suffered in 1790 in the midst of their steppes at the hands of the Ural Cossacks had in no way corresponded to her humanitarian intentions nor to the expectations of the ministry.

In the midst of the disturbances which were then troubling the Little Horde, we should note Erali's request for a house to be built for him near the fort of Orsk and the request of Sultan Ishim for the construction of a city in the midst of the steppes. Circumstances did not permit the satisfaction of this last demand at that time, but Erali's request would have been granted if he had not died in the month of June, 1794, after ruling the Little Horde for three years.

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for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon became useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim. Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali, but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council, inspired much more confidence in the government and had much more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to promise various advantages. However, what followed did not justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader. The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde. The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples, which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased from one day to the next, and finally the [illegible] spread everywhere.

These circumstances produced very important consequences. Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

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very peaceful. To the south there is once again the Great Horde, or the subjects of what is now the khanate of Kokand, including the people of Tashkent, Turkestan, etc., who are little accustomed to war and little inclined to make raids upon the Kazak peoples. With these neighbors, the Middle Horde was exposed only to the attacks of the Bashkirs, who bordered it on the side of the fort of Troitsk, and to those of the Buruts in the south. But the extent to which these peoples could do damage was so small compared to the expanse of its lands, that one must admit the advantages of its geographical position over that of the Little Horde and to conclude therefore that it was much less troubled than the latter from the outside.

Having clarified our first thought, we believe it is also very simple to explain the second. For there is no doubt that a people which is less often obliged to defend itself against outside attack and less frequently prompted to wreak vengeance acquires milder habits than a people which is always doing battle with its enemies. We will note, in addition, that the khans and sultans of the Middle Horde always had more power and influence over their subjects than those of the Little Horde. In this connection the long administration of Ablai, first as sultan and later as khan, was particularly useful.

The Kazaks who followed Ablai became accustomed under him to peace and the obedience which one can expect from a half-savage people, and they remained peaceful under his son Vali, although his khan did not have his father's talent for gaining the general respect. On the other hand, however, he made a show of never seeking the protection of Russia, paid no attention to the demands of the authorities of the Siberian borders, refused to surrender the Turkmen who had fled with the Kalmuks from the government of Astrakhan and who were later held by Ablai, and finally he persecuted the elders who were devoted to Russia. In 1789 a large number of people who were considered [295] his subjects crossed over into Russia with Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, in order to establish themselves permanently there, and they received lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk for their settlement.

221 [312 cont.]
[484] have their principal festivals at this time also. They also choose
autumn to practice barantas (2), for this season is favorable because
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2. See footnote 1, Chapter II, page 167, on the barantas.

of the darkness of the nights and the vigor of the horses, which have been restored in good pastures for a whole season and are all the better disposed for long-distance and rapid running.

361 The Kazaks rarely camp in large numbers in the same place,
721 for their herds would be too cramped for space. But they form groups of several families, united by ties of blood or by reciprocal advantages. These groups move in a body from one place to another and do not separate unless there are important reasons. These mobile villages are called auls. The number of tents which comprise them depends on the circumstances.

101 Some Kazaks live in Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, the
[241] possessions of [313] China, in Tashkent and Kokand, and in these
342 places they have houses, lands, and gardens (1), but their number is very limited.

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1. It is said that in the last years of the 18th century, Karabulat, a rich Kazak of the Durt-Kara tribe of the Little Horde,
[361] built a small fort made of clay on the shore of the Syr [Darya]. Inside he built a small mosque, also of clay, and lived near it in his tent, in the midst of a large number of his kinsmen and faithful adherents, who camped with him. This fort, which
103 soon tumbled down, was called Kara-Bulat-Tam i.e., "Karabulat's wall." Caravans came to this place to buy provisions and paid a small toll to the lord for free passage across his pasture lands. There were also some cultivated lands near the fort.

[315 cont.]

181 152 [636 342]

often as its own expense, and has used every means of persuasion to induce certain individuals among them to settle down, at least to provide an example. But all these efforts have been futile.

[579 627 628 578] their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical relations of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by one individual against another, the participation of their families in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes, and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes require [166] hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle Horde, with its khan, Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River. Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:

166 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their winter camps on the banks of the Ilek, although they had always

578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions, during which their enemies were supported by the khan of Khiva. At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the

the same time several auls which habitually camped near the
sian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads
o the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and
nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form
manent establishments, and that for their own advantage as